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If I draw the attention of someone who is not a philosopher to 
a red patch and ask whether he sees something red will say that he 
does. If I explain to him the difference between red objects and red 
sensa, between red patches which are alleged to exist not merely in 
one's mind but in the world and red patches about which no such 
commitment is made, he will say that he certainly sees at least a 
red sensum. Asked how he knows he is seeing it, he will respond 
with a puzzled stare. If I insist on an answer he will say, in effect, 
that he understands the meaning of 'I (he himself) am (is) seeing a 
red patch' and understands the difference between seeing a red 
object and seeing a red sensum, but that he continues to have at 
least a red sensum in his visual consciousness and that that is suf-
ficient to justify his belief that he is seeing it. If pressed further, he 
will want to know what more I could want, what further questions 
remain to be settled. 
In the first part of this paper I argue that Lawrence BonJour's 
coherence theory of how such empirical knowledge is acquired 
does not work. In the second part I argue that our man-in-the-street 
has neglected to mention a crucial intellectual operation which has 
in fact occurred—an operation quite different from anything pro-
posed by BonJour—and that when this operation is identified and 
made explicit his account will prove to be correct. The argument 
will be neither foundational ist, in the usual sense of that term, nor 
coherentist. Nor will it appeal to language, "common sense," or 
pragmatic values. 
I. BonJour's Coherence Theory 
In an important and much discussed book, BonJour argues that: 
There are no basic empirical beliefs . . . whose 
justification does not depend on that of any fur-
ther belief. [BonJour, p. 32] 
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It follows that the actual presence in or to one's consciousness 
of a datum of sense does not suffice to justify one's belief that that 
is the case. Since, as we shall see, on BonJour's theory the sensum 
itself plays no role at all in justifying the belief in question, the 
man-in-the-street account given above would be not merely in-
complete but wrong from the start. 
It is important to see at the outset just how counter-intuitive 
BonJour's account of first person empirical knowledge is. 
He distinguishes sharply between the cause or origin of one's 
empirical belief and its justification. The cause or origin of an 
empirical belief may be extratheoretical (which for BonJour is not 
necessarily the same as extra-mental, as we shall see), but one's 
justification for believing it is to be found only in the coherence of 
that belief with other beliefs together with the a priori "theorem" 
that such coherence implies extratheoretical causation and, there-
fore, truth. Where the problem is to determine whether a sensum 
present to one's consciousness is or represents an extra-mental 
object, this cause-justification distinction may seem appropriate. 
For we have the problem just because we do not have, or cannot 
know we have, direct perceptual access to extra-mental objects or 
to the extra-mentality of sensa of which we are directly aware (A 
mental red patch looks just like an extra-mental red patch). 
But where the issue is whether one is perceiving the sensum 
which he is in fact perceiving, the result seems very odd indeed. 
For since BonJour holds that justification by coherence with other 
beliefs is approximated only in the long run and is only probable, it 
follows that although in the short run one might be more justified 
than not in believing one is seeing a red patch, in the long run one 
may be more justified than not in believing one was seeing a green 
patch—although all along one has only been hearing a siren-like 
noise and having no visual experience at all! 
It is not easy to see how to avoid this result if the sensum itself 
plays no part in justifying one's beliefs about it. And because infer-
ence to an extra-mental object would, on BonJour's account, re-
quire a prior inference that there is a sensum present in or to one's 
consciousness, any implausibility attaching to the latter procedure 
will attach to the former inference as well. BonJour's separation of 
the origin of a belief from its justification and his view that basic 
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beliefs can be justified only through other beliefs lead to this re-
sult. But he need not—and perhaps would not—reject either view 
for this reason; he may simply choose to live with the near paradox 
they imply. Others will find such a result an unacceptable. 
I agree that the mere perceptual presence of a datum of sense 
does not by itself suffice to justify the claim that one is having it, 
and in part II I offer a more plausible theory of what else is needed 
in addition to the sensum. 
BonJour's reason for holding that a basic empirical belief can 
be justified only by other beliefs is as follows: 
...I will assume that such a belief is always the 
belief, linguistically formulable only in expressive 
language ... that a certain specific content is 
present, for example that I seem to see something 
red. If this belief is true.... then it must also be the 
case, second, that a red element [i.e., sensum] is 
present in the experience of the person in ques-
tion. But these two elements are not enough. The 
[experiential content] must be grasped or appre-
hended .... Is [this apprehension] cognitive or 
non-cognitive, judgmental or non-judgmental? ... 
If the apprehension of the given is cognitive or 
judgmental... [then it is] difficult or impossible to 
see why it does not itself require justification. If it 
is non-judgmental and non-cognitive... then there 
is no apparent way for that apprehension to pro-
vide any sort of epistemic justification. [BonJour, 
p. 74-75.] 
By "expressive language" BonJour means "language that nei-
ther asserts objective reality of what appears nor denies any, [con-
fining] itself to the content of presentation itself." I will continue 
to refer to such items as 'sensa'. Thus his argument applies equally 
to immanent ("subjective") and non-immanent ("objective") sensa. 
It is important to be clear about this. The problem for BonJour is 
not, or not only, how we can know that such sensa belong to or 
represent an extra-mental object, but how we can justify our belief 
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that we are experiencing them, regardless of their status as mental 
or extra-mental. 
Notice also that BonJour is not challenging the correspondence 
theory of truth: I seem to he seeing something red is true only "if 
such an element is present to my consciousness." The issue is how 
such beliefs are justified, not what it is for them to be true. The 
reason BonJour sees "no apparent way" for the sensum to justify 
the belief that one is experiencing it is that he sees the sensum as 
epistemically incommensurate with the propositional nature of 
belief.1 
How after all can a red experiential element fail to 
be logically distinct from the cognitive apprehen-
sion that such an element is present? The latter, 
unlike the former is propositionally formed, ca-
pable of being true or false, and capable of serv-
ing as the premise of an inference; whereas the 
former, unlike the latter, is literally red (in the ap-
propriate sense). How can two things as different 
from this fail to be distinct? [BonJour, p. 76] 
For BonJour the fact that the bare experience of sensum is "logi-
cally distinct" from—not epistemically the same sort of thing as— 
the cognitive apprehension of it means that the sensum is inca-
pable of implying the truth of the belief and therefore incapable of 
justifying it. Because the sensum is not a proposition it is simply 
irrelevant to what BonJour sees as the strictly propositional opera-
tions of justifying beliefs. In much the same spirit that Hume does 
not allow an ought to be derived from an is, BonJour does not 
' The expression 'epistemically incommensurate' is mine, not BonJour's. But 
if a sensum, just as it is, can be the sort of thing which makes the proposition 
asserting its presence in consciousness true, why cannot the same sensum,y'M.y/ö.v 
it is be the sort of thing which can justify that proposition? I suspect there may a 
good reason for this asymmetry, though space does not permit adequate discus-
sion here. Briefly, truth arises from the conformity of the mind to the object to be 
known, but justification seems arise from the conformity of cognitive procedure 
to the needs and norms of intellectual curiosity. This account of justification is 
discussed in the text (II.2). 
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allow justification to be derived from a bare perception, but only 
from a fact of perception which is known to the subject to be a fact 
and is itself, therefore, propositional. Hence the vicious regress. 
1.1. Spontaneous Empirical Beliefs 
According to BonJour, one find one's self holding empirical 
beliefs which are pot derived from any previous beliefs: for ex-
ample, the belief that one is seeing a red patch. These "spontane-
ous empirical beliefs" (or SEBs) are said to provide candidates, 
but only candidates, for extratheoretic input (ETI), an input which 
he, unlike other coherence theorists, holds to be indispensable. 
Again it is essential to note that for BonJour 'extratheoretic' means 
non-conceptual, not or not necessarily, extra-mental. It is the radi-
cal claim that we are not justified in believing we are seeing a red 
patch merely because we are seeing it which, in my view, makes 
his theory interesting. 
These beliefs are to be justified, not by reference to the sensum 
itself, but by their coherence with other beliefs, including beliefs 
of the same kind as the belief in question, and ultimately by the a 
priori theorem that extratheoretic causation is the best explanation 
of such coherence. Extratheoretic causation, in turn, implies truth. 
He sees, of course, that the attempt to justify the coherence judg-
ments themselves by an appeal to further coherence judgments leads 
to a vicious regress; but he declines to explain how such judg-
ments are justified, candidly acknowledging that his account is, to 
that extent, incomplete. 
Now, it seems obvious that we can and do have SEBs. But 
suppose that we have read BonJour and, therefore, realize that our 
SEBs stand in need of justification—may, for all their force and 
spontaneity, be false? Do we now have such spontaneous beliefs 
or don't we? Surely, one cannot have it both ways. One cannot 
continue to hold a belief at the very same epistemic instant that she 
realizes it requires justification and, therefore, that she does not 
know whether it is true—after all, a belief is a genuine conviction. 
It would seem that BonJour's theory makes an SEB a candidate for 
input, in part, because we believe it and a candidate for justifica-
tion because we don't believe it. 
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But, surely, raising the issue of justification changes an un-
grounded "belief into an hypothesis, and resolving the issue of 
justification promotes an hypothesis to a justified true belief. Justi-
fication does not change a belief we do not really believe into one 
we really do believe. 
It follows that there are no SEBs of one's own available to 
one's self after the issue of their justification has arisen. For to see 
the need for such justification is to see that one ought not to have 
held the belief in the first place. As a philosopher interested in 
epistemology one is in just this position and cannot help being in 
it. One might recall that one did have such a justification-indiffer-
ent "belief," although one no longer has it; but then one would 
have to see the previous "belief," not exactly as a mistake, but, as 
argue below (II.4), as an epistemic misfire, a lapse from the status 
of fully competent cognitional player, But if an alleged SEB has 
no epistemic credibility, why, apart from its' being underived from 
intratheoretic items, should it be any better a candidate for 
extratheoretical causation than any other vivid experience? 
1.2. Naturalized or Normative Epistemology? 
The appeal to SEBs conflates normative and naturalistic theo-
ries of cognition. We are told that when one is experiencing a red 
patch the belief that one is experiencing it is "forced upon him" 
but that this compulsion does not justify the belief. [BonJour, p. 117.] 
But can an empirical belief be caused in a rational subject in a 
naturalistic or quasi-naturalistic way by items in the extratheoretic 
world? If a belief can be said to be "forced" on a rational subject 
'when he is being fully rational, the compulsion must surely be a 
rationally normative one, essentially and intimately connected with 
the sensum, but not the sort compulsion with which extreme heat 
causes pain or red stage lighting makes things appear reddish. 
Similarly, the red patch cannot, properly speaking, be an effi-
cient cause of the truth of the belief that one is seeing it. (As far as 
I know, BonJour doesn't says that it can.) The sensum makes the 
belief about it true just by being what it is affirmed to be: a red 
patch present in my consciousness. That an item is such-and-such, 
and thus that the hypothesis that it is a such-and-such is true, may 
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be perhaps inferred from its effects; but the only assertion that the 
item's causal efficacy can make true is the assertion that it has such 
efficacy. Even in this case the truth relation does not consist of any 
sort of efficient causality. 
What is naturalistically "forced" upon a rational subject in this 
way, it seems to me, is the sensum, not any understanding of it, not 
the fact that it constrains a theory, and not the belief or even the 
hypothesis that one is perceiving it. BonJour sees that the sort of 
belief we really want is properly normative—that is why he thinks 
it must be justified through coherence. But at the same time he 
clings to a non-normative view of belief, perhaps in the hope that it 
will help establish the possibility of a causal, existential hook-up 
with the extratheoretic. (BonJour makes this connection primarily 
through the a prior "theorem" attributing coherence to extratheoretic 
causation. I have no objection to the a priori theorem, at least none 
I will develop in this paper.) 
1.3. Will Spontaneous Empirical Hypotheses Serve as 
Candidates for Extratheoretic Input? 
Without SEBs we are left with spontaneous empirical hypoth-
eses (SEHs). These would indeed eliminate the need to be in two 
epistemically incompatible places at once. But now there are other 
serious difficulties, as Bonjour is very much aware. (BonJour, pp. 
107-8,149-53). Seeing in some detail just why SEHs will not serve 
will help the reader follow the account of empirical knowledge 
developed in Part II. 
Obviously, SEHs make very implausible candidates for 
extratheoretical input—that is one of the reason BonJour thinks he 
needs SEBs. To say that the mere occurrence of an empirical hy-
pothesis constitutes grounds for thinking it a candidate for supply-
ing such input is to lose the very notion of an hypothesis. The fact 
that such an hypotheses is underived from other hypotheses or be-
lief comes a little nearer the mark, although I confess I do not know 
in what sense of 'derive' one might derive an hypothesis from a 
belief. 
(1) Note that the hypothetical status of proposition consists in 
its not being known by the subject to be true, not in its not being 
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true. Thus those who, like BonJour, espouse a causal theory of 
truth can also hold that an empirical proposition may function as 
an hypothesis for the subject even though it is in fact 
extratheoretically caused, provided the subject does not know that 
it is so caused. But that an SEH is a candidate for ETI must, on 
BonJour's theory, be known prior to learning, via coherence, that 
it is extratheoretically caused; so its actually being so caused can 
do nothing to establish the SEH as a candidate for such input. 
(2) We have seen that one cannot hold both normative and natu-
ralistic epistemologies about belief. Similar normative difficulties 
would arise with a causal theory of hypotheses, for an empirical 
hypothesis is an intelligent and intelligible characterization of the 
sensum. On the one hand, its normativity cannot be that of a ratio-
nal belief, since even a wrong hypothesis may be perfectly intelli-
gible. On the other hand, its intelligibility is quite different from 
the perceptual awareness imposed by a sensum and, as we have 
seen, cannot be the result of having had certain efficient causes. 
The function of any hypothesis is to move the cognitional project 
from the level of sense to the level of intelligibility, and it would 
seem that something more than mere sense input is need to do this. 
(3) There is the obvious difficulty that the number and range 
of empirical hypotheses are largely a function of human inventive-
ness and time. Thus the problems of assessing coherence and show-
ing that there could not be more than one complete and coherent 
theory become very much more difficult. [BonJour, pp. 107-8,149-
53] 
Although I will speak of spontaneous empirical beliefs (SEBs) 
in what follows, I will often mention spontaneous empirical hy-
potheses (SEHs) as well—just to remind the reader that there are 
no such things as SEBs available to him as an epistemologist and 
to note that the argument then in progress works for both SEHs as 
well. 
1.4. Extratheoretic Input, Justification, and Sensa 
I said above that on BonJour's theory the presence or absence 
of the accompanying sensum is quite irrelevant to the justification 
of one's belief that one is experiencing it. It is also irrelevant to the 
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identification of SEBs (or SEHs) as a candidates for ETI. It is im-
portant to see in detail why both of these results follow. 
BonJour insists that there must be at least the possibility of 
extratheoretic input, and he thinks that as candidates for ETI SEBs 
provide this possibility. But the grounds for believing that SEBs 
(or SEHs) are candidates for this role cannot be any knowledge 
that they in fact are, or probably are, extratheoretically caused. For 
given BonJour's view that such causality implies truth, this knowl-
edge would provide some justification, however slight, for our 
thinking they are true—a justification which has nothing to do with 
coherence. For this reason, BonJour makes candidacy for ETI de-
pend only on an SEB's not being derived from any other belief and 
the fact that we strongly (but not yet justifiably) believe it. But 
neither the fact that SEBs are not derived from other beliefs nor 
the fact that we "believe" them tells us anything about whether 
such beliefs actually are so caused, as BonJour himself insist. 
I have just distinguished the claim that an SEB (or SEH) might 
(or might not) be extratheoretical ly caused from the "theorem" that 
any individual SEB or, more accurately, any coherent set of such 
SEBs (or hypotheses) probably is so caused and, therefore, true. 
Now it is the "theorem" alone which provides positive grounds for 
inferring ETI, that is, causation of the SEB by the sensum, from its 
coherence with other beliefs; and the grounds for holding the theo-
rem to be true are entirely a priori, as BonJour also insists. 
The fact that the theorem is supposed to apply only to SEBs 
might be thought to supply an a posteriori component to justifica-
tion, but no help is to be found in that quarter. For, since any SEB 
might turn out to be false, it might also turn out that there was 
never any sensum, and hence never any extratheoretic cause of the 
belief, to start with—the fact that one was perceiving it notwith-
standing. All that counts in an SEB is the fact that such a belief 
might have extratheoretical causes and that one spontaneously "be-
lieves" that it does. To repeat, the fact that it is an SEB tells us 
nothing about whether it is actually so caused. For the same rea-
son, the fact that an underived belief is extratheoretically caused 
can play no part in our identifying it as a candidate for ETI, al-
though its being underived from other beliefs (or hypotheses) can. 
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Thus, both the status of a belief (or SEH) that one is experi-
encing a sensum as a candidate for ETI and the justification of that 
belief are completely independent of the actual presence or ab-
sence of the sensum. 
Obviously, this result cannot be blocked by arguing that one 
could not have the SEB that one was experiencing the sensum un-
less one were in fact experiencing it; for this would be a retreat 
either to a correspondence or to a causal (externalist) theory of 
justification, both of which BonJour of course rejects. 
If BonJour's theory allows for extratheoretical input, it does 
not do so through its account of justification, but through it causal 
theory of truth. I have argued above (1.2) that an extratheoretic 
event is not, merely as an efficient cause, sufficient to bring about 
either a belief or an hypothesis, or their truth, because these are 
irreducibly normative in a way that a natural, efficient causes is 
not. 
1.5. The "Doxastic Presumption" 
Professor BonJour is very much concerned with how one can 
know that one has an SEB and how one can know that he holds his 
total set of beliefs. These two problems arise because, according to 
BonJour, having an SEB or a set of them is itself an empirical 
event, knowledge of which is essential to the application of the 
coherence theory of empirical knowledge being proposed. [BonJour, 
80-1]. The "doxastic presumption" (DP) is offered as the solution 
to both these alleged difficulties. 
DP is the claim that to ask whether a belief or set of beliefs is 
justified is to presuppose that we have the beliefs. BonJour sees 
that DP cannot function as a premise: "for to apply i t . . . would 
require . . . the further premise that I do in fact have such specific 
beliefs, and the justification of these further premises would obvi-
ously be just as problematic as before." His solution is to view DP 
as a "practice" in something like Wittgenstein's sense. 
But one philosopher's "practice" may be another philosopher's 
ducked issue. One cannot simply rely on DP as a practice; one 
must be prepared to show that it is a justified practice, and BonJour 
does in fact do a convincing job of justifying it. But if there is a 
ADIEU BONJOUR 133 
problem about knowing that we hold our SEBs (or SEHs), will 
there not also be a problem about knowing that we believe DP, so 
that DP would have to be applied to itself? Not for BonJour. The 
difficulty DP is intended to remedy arises in connection with SEBs, 
and DP itself is, near enough, analytic. Thus he need not deal with 
this difficulty at all; for, it will be recalled, BonJour declines to 
offer any account of non-empirical knowledge. 
But if knowing that one holds an SEB (or SEH) were a genu-
ine problem, it would, it seems to me, be very necessary for BonJour 
to explain why it is not a problem for non-empirical beliefs (or 
hypotheses) as well, and such an explanation does not readily 
present itself. 
Fortunately, however, there isn't any problem about knowing 
that we hold either kind of belief. The requirement that one know, 
that is, have a justified true belief (or hypothesis) that one is hav-
ing a belief (or hypothesis) surely entails per se a vicious regress. 
In general it cannot be a necessary condition for justifying an em-
pirical belief that one first acquire a justified empirical belief. In 
the case at hand, it cannot be a necessary condition for the justifi-
cation of a belief (p) or an hypothesis (h) that one have a justified 
true belief that one believes (p) or hypothesizes (h). As we shall 
see in a moment, what is necessary in order to move on to the issue 
of justification is just that one consciously hold (p) or hypothesize 
<h). 
It may be thought that such knowledge is needed for the global 
assessment of coherence which BonJour's theory requires. But 
neither the question of what beliefs we hold but are not presently 
conscious of nor the question of what beliefs we are now holding 
consciously requires for its resolution that we form a justified true 
belief. The first requires only that we recall the belief and continue 
to hold it; the second, as already noted, requires only that we con-
sciously hold the belief at the time we seek to justify it. I argue for 
this analysis below (1.6). 
The moral is not that the doxastic presumption is wrong—I 
think it is plainly right—but that it is not needed. 
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1.6. The Doxastic Presumption and Constitutive 
Consciousness 
We have just seen (1.5) that it cannot be a necessary condition 
for acquiring a justified true belief that we first acquire a justified 
true belief. But in order to make another, more interesting point 
about the allege need for DP, it will be necessary to distinguish the 
various kinds and stages of "taking cognitive possession." 
First, experiencing a sensum, entertaining an hypothesis about, 
or having an insight into, that sensum, and forming a justified judg-
ment that that hypothesis or insight is or is not correct are all acts 
of "taking cognitive possession:" that is, they are all conscious acts 
and they are all elements of empirical knowledge. But they obvi-
ously differ in very significant ways, are experienced as different 
kinds of consciousness and serve different but complementary func-
tions. It requires no intelligence to have a percept; it does require 
intelligence to formulate an hypothesis about it, wonder whether 
the hypothesis is true, and determine that it is or is not. To talk of 
"taking cognitive possession" as though it consisted only of its 
final consummation in a justified judgment, or to speak vaguely 
about some epistemic act or other, blurs the relevant context and 
sets the stage for more serious confusions. 
Second, it is not necessary to know (have a justified true belief 
or hypothesis) that one is holding a belief or hypothesis in order to 
raise and answer the question of its truth. It is one thing to know, 
believe, or hypothesize that, say, snow is white and another thing 
to know that one knows, believes or hypothesizes that it is. The 
first level acts of cognition do not require the second level acts of 
cognition, even if justification is by coherence. And the second 
level acts would not make us any more knowing or believing about 
the color of snow or any more understanding of our hypothesis 
about it. This is obvious from the fact that we could not know, 
believe, or hypothesize that we know, believe, or hypothesize that 
snow is white unless we already knew, believed, or hypothesized 
that it is, for there would as yet be no first level cognitional acts to 
know, believe, or hypothesize about. The doxastic presumption 
suggests this point but does not focus on it in quite the right way, 
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and the doctrine of spontaneous empirical beliefs buries it in 
muddle. 
Believing or hypothesizing about the color of snow matures 
into knowledge about the color of snow; it does not mature into 
knowledge that one is having the conscious experience of believ-
ing, hypothesizing or knowing about the color of snow, for none of 
these were the content of the belief or hypothesis. 
On the other hand, such second level cognitions, if they occur, 
are genuinely new acts of knowing. To ask why an act of believing 
that snow is white is an act of believing and not an act of hypoth-
esizing, is to learn some epistemology, not to learn a bit of meteo-
rology. Similarly, to know that snow is white is to have a justified 
true belief or hypothesis about snow; but to know that one has 
such knowledge is to know, not only about snow, but about one's 
cognitional acts. 
It follows that the proposition we been focusing on—/ am 
seeing a red patch does not give us the first level hypothesis we 
want. It poses a second level question about our experiencing, 
whereas what we want to know is just whether there is a red patch; 
that is, we want to ask this without also asking whether one is 
having the experience of seeing it. I have used the expression until 
know to avoid distracting complications. 
There is no problem with the distinction, but the language re-
sists expressing it both adequately and briefly. There is a red patch 
will serve, provided we understand, without proposing or affirm-
ing, that the patch is present in or to the consciousness of the sub-
ject considering the proposition; that is, the reference to someone's 
conscious experience serves to identify or describe the proposition 
we wish to consider but is not part of that proposition (Compare: 
T h e man in the gray suit is drinking scotch'. The sartorial situa-
tion is not part of the proposition being asserted, since the proposi-
tion would remain true even if the suit were brown.) With this un-
derstanding I will be using There is a red patch from this point on. 
Third, doesn't raising the issue of whether we are justified in 
holding a belief or in affirming an hypothesis require us (a) in some 
sense to take "cognitive possession" of the belief or hypothesis 
and of the fact that it is occurring to us, and (b) won't such taking 
cognitive possession require justification and thus launch a vicious 
136 AUSLEGUNG 
regress? This is, after all , BonJour ' s main object ion to 
foundationalism. The answer to (a) is yes; the answer to (b) is no. 
(a) The act of forming a belief or inventing an hypothesis is an 
empirical event which is already conscious, and its content is al-
ready a "taking cognitive possession" of a certain preliminary and 
incomplete way. Only in the sense in which believing or hypoth-
esizing is already a conscious act is it required to have "cognitive 
possession o f one's believing or hypothesizing (I shall explain 
the scare quotes around ' o f in a moment). And only in the sense 
that the belief or hypothesis itself is already the content of such act 
is it required for us to have "cognitive possession" of it. 
If the belief or hypothesis is (somehow) justified we will also 
be in cognitive possession of the fact, for example, that snow is 
white. But justification does not require a second act of knowing, 
the object of which is the believing or hypothesizing (or the belief 
or hypothesis). It requires the addition of another kind of conscious, 
cognitional act to the believing or hypothesizing: an act of inquir-
ing about and verifying its truth. This is a further development in 
the cognitional project of which the believing or hypothesizing was 
a preliminary stage. The point of these further operations is not to 
know whether our presently conscious belief or hypothesis has 
occurred, but to determine whether or not it is true. Knowing, that 
is, having a justified true hypothesis or belief, that we are believ-
ing or hypothesizing would do nothing to aid in this project and 
would lead to a vicious regress, as was shown above. 
Of course one might inquire whether one is believing, hypoth-
esizing or experiencing (a very different inquiry from the one to 
which the original believing, hypothesizing or experiencing was 
directed), and then these would become objects of consciousness, 
as distinct from the original conscious acts themselves (hence the 
scare quotes around ' o f two paragraphs back). This distinction is 
crucial. There is a tendency to think of consciousness as though it 
itself were an object of consciousness (so self-consciousness be-
comes a kind of looking at one's consciousness looking at itself). 
But this is like saying that power of sight consists of looking at 
one's eyes. If the eyes are blind they will see neither themselves 
nor anything else, and their not being blind just is their being visu-
ally conscious regardless of what they happen to be looking at. 
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In the same way, experiencing, inquiring, hypothesizing, catch-
ing on, believing, justifying are all intrinsically conscious; they do 
not require to be made conscious by becoming objects or contents 
of consciousness. Consciousness, albeit of different kinds, is con-
stitutive of such acts in a way that it is not constitutive of their 
objects or contents, whose status as conscious is derived from the 
consciousness ("consciousing") which is epistemically prior. 
For this reason objects or contents of consciousness, as such, 
are conscious neither of themselves nor of anything else, while 
what is intrinsically and constitutive conscious is conscious " o f 
itself non-dualistically, that is, simply by being the consciousness 
("consciousing") it is; and this is a necessary condition for its be-
ing conscious of anything else. On the other hand (and more 
plainly), consciousness is not in any way constitutive of the opera-
tion of one's pancreas, and the operation of one's pancreas does 
not become conscious in the epistemically prior sense of 'conscious-
ness' when one thinks about it. (Immanent sensa, concepts, be-
liefs, and hypotheses occupy an intermediate position between what 
is intrinsically, constitutively conscious and what is not conscious 
at all; we are inclined to say that they exist only as objects of or in 
consciousness. 
What is required for empirical knowledge, then, is that we have 
been believing or hypothesizing about data and that we are subse-
quently successful (in a way yet to be discussed) in justifying that 
belief or hypothesis. To think that the successive stages in empiri-
cal knowing have each to be known in order for the act of knowing 
to occur is to miss the way these different cognitional operations— 
these different stages of "taking cognitive possession"—fit together 
to constitute knowledge. Before there can be any question of 
grounds for a judgment of truth, there must be an hypothesis, be-
lief, or insight about which to judge, and these will be about some 
content of experience—data, in the broad sense (For this sense of 
'data' see below (1.7.) None of these by itself is an act of knowing 
and, although each is the content of a distinct kind of conscious-
ness, none of them need be known, that is, need be the content of a 
justified true belief or hypothesis. 
On this view, knowing is not a complex of acts of knowing; it 
is a functional integration of differentiated conscious acts and ob-
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jects of such acts, culminating (in a way yet to be discussed) in a 
justified hypothesis, insight, or belief. Every such set of epistemic 
acts—including those which result in correct epistemological theo-
ries—is an empirical event in BonJour's sense, that is, something 
that happens. Nevertheless, it is epistemically complete; it does 
not require to be subsumed under some other epistemic event. 
So it is important to be clear about which inquiry one is refer-
ring to, which stage in the cognitional process one is talking about, 
and whether one is talking about a conscious act or the object of 
such an act. If I am interested in knowing whether snow is white, I 
go on to investigate the evidence (foundationalist or otherwise) 
relevant to the color of snow; if I am asking whether I am experi-
encing the white, cold, fluffy stuff descending from the sky, I must 
also go on to investigate the evidence for my performing a certain 
kind of conscious act. This second level experiencing, by which 
the original, first level experiencing is made an object of conscious-
ness (it was already conscious in the other sense), does not by it-
self constitute one's knowing (having a justified true hypothesis or 
belief) that one is having the original experience, any more than 
sensing the red patch means that one knows there is a red patch. 
(b) It is should now evident that there need be no problem 
about justifying one's belief or hypothesis that one is having a be-
lief or hypothesis. No such second level knowledge, and therefore 
no such second level belief or hypothesis, is required so long as 
one is only interested in justifying the first level belief or hypoth-
esis. In the same way, to inquire whether a set of beliefs or hypoth-
eses is coherent is to inquire about the logical relations among the 
beliefs or hypotheses, not about whether one is having them. Be-
low (II.2) I show how these the components of cognition can be 
known—when it is necessary to know them—without a vicious 
regress. 
1.7. Sensa and Propositions As Data 
Formulating the problem narrowly in terms of sensa is mis-
leading. The crucial difficulty, it seems to me, is the epistemic move 
from any content or object of consciousness which is not yet un-
derstood or fully understood, to the understanding and knowing of 
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that content. It is the present opacity to intelligence of an item in 
consciousness (or of some feature of it) which is relevant, not the 
fact that the item happens to be an object of sense. Now, to ask 
whether our entire set of beliefs (or hypotheses) is ("approxi-
mately") coherent may imply that we hold those beliefs (or hy-
potheses), but it does not tell us whether they are in fact coherent. 
To know this, we need some sort of foundationalism. It is, I sus-
pect, because BonJour sees this need in the case of justifying co-
herence judgments that he declines to explain how they are justi-
fied. But he does not see any parallel possibility in the case of first-
level empirical judgment [BonJour, pp. 104-5.] 
There is a certain "picture" of how knowing occurs at work 
here. On this view, to put it rather epigrammatically, sensa are for 
looking at, touching, hearing, smelling, etc., and concepts (alter-
nately, language) are for understanding. There is no possibility of 
deriving concepts or propositions from sensa by an act of under-
standing ("gaining cognitive possession") which makes the sensa 
intelligible and known. On the other hand, one can "take cognitive 
possession" of the coherence of one's beliefs or hypotheses, with-
out any further operation of intelligence, merely by taking a con-
ceptual "look" at them collectively, because they are propositions 
and hence already intelligible. 
But it seems obvious that a further operation of intelligence is 
needed in order to know whether one's beliefs are coherent; for, 
again, it is one thing to have all one's beliefs in mind (either im-
plicitly or explicitly) and quite another to evaluate their coherence. 
The unrelated beliefs (or hypotheses) are, in my view, merely data 
for such additional understanding, just as sensa are merely data for 
whatever understanding of them we can attain. By 'data' in this 
extended sense I mean whatever one is conscious of prior to mak-
ing it an object of intellectual inquiry and understanding. So if there 
is a problem with justification in "taking cognitive possession" of 
the sensum, there will be the same problem with taking cognitive 
possession of the coherence or incoherence of our beliefs (and of 
the conclusions that follow from our premises). BonJour sees that 
intelligent operation on the beliefs themselves is required to grasp 
their coherence; he does not see that the same sort of act is needed 
to grasp an empirical fact. 
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Further, if one can have insights into propositional data with-
out launching a vicious regress, then why not into data of sense? 
BonJour observes, almost as though it settled the issue, that the 
proposition lam seeing a red patch does not "look like" a red patch 
[BonJour, pp. 76]. But neither does a bundle of unrelated beliefs 
(or hypotheses) "look conceptually" like the proposition These 
beliefs or hypotheses) are a coherent. It is true that the proposi-
tions taken separately are already understood (although even con-
sidered individually few are likely to be understood exhaustively), 
while the sensa merely as experienced are not understood at all; 
but is this difference sufficient to make the as yet unknown rela-
tions among the propositions open to direct insight while sensa 
remain forever closed to it? Is the crucial distinction the one be-
tween data of sense and propositional data, as BonJour seems to 
hold, or the one between data of any type and the understanding of 
the data? Against BonJour's view it may be pointed out that we do 
not, in the most fundamental case, infer one proposition from an-
other by means of other propositions. We do so by the direct in-
sight that they are related in a certain way. 
Thus far nothing has been said about how the product of either 
type of insight is justified. Both the act of direct understanding and 
its justification will be discussed in Part II. But it may be noted 
here that this possibility alters the issue. The problem will no longer 
be how to justify an SEB (or SEH) by means of unintelligible raw 
data of sense, but how to justify an act of understanding which 
purports to make the raw data intelligible. 
1.8. Summary of Part I 
I suggested that understanding data of sense does not differ 
radically from the understanding of the ensemble of propositional 
data required for a coherence judgment. I proposed (a possible, 
unresolved difficulty notwithstanding) that in both cases there is 
an intrinsic but latent intelligibility to be grasped. If such an in-
sight can produce justified true belief in one case, as BonJour ad-
mits, it would seem can do so in the other, as well. 
I argued that it is not possible to hold a belief at the same 
epistemic moment that one is aware that it is in need of justifica-
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tion and, therefore, that there can be no SEBs for a rational subject. 
The problem thus became one of justifying an empirical hypoth-
esis through its coherence with other empirical hypotheses, I con-
siderable more daunting project. 
Once the naturalistic epistemology implicit in the theory of 
extratheoretically caused spontaneous empirical beliefs was set 
aside, it also became clear why on BonJour's theory the actual 
presence of a sensum in one's consciousness plays no role at all in 
the justification, as distinct from the truth, of the assertion that one 
is experiencing it. For the fact that there has actually been such 
input becomes epistemically available only as a consequence of 
justification. For the same reason the sensum can play no role in 
our identifying an SEB as a candidate for input. Nor does the sensum 
play any part in constituting a belief as a spontaneous empirical 
belief, for the belief that we are experiencing a sensum might turn 
out to be false and, therefore, not to have been caused by a sensum. 
I argue that the sensum cannot be an efficient cause of a belief, 
hypothesis, or their truth, for these are all normative in a way that 
cannot be produced by an efficient cause. 
A more detailed analysis of the operations constitutive of know-
ing showed that the "doxastic presumption" allegedly required in 
order to know that we are in fact experiencing an empirical belief 
is unnecessary. Further, I argued that the requirement that we 
know—have a justified true belief—that we hold an empirical be-
lief (or any belief or hypothesis) in order to justify it is per se vi-
ciously circular. 
In fact Professor BonJour's ingenious and painstakingly ar-
gued theory does not adequately address the fundamental problem 
in justifying empirical beliefs or hypotheses, not only because, as 
he himself acknowledges, no account is given of how coherence 
judgments are justified, but, surprisingly, because justification lies 
in an entirely different quarter. 
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II. A Theory of Empirical Knowledge 2 
I do not think the problem which motivates BonJour's theory 
can be dismissed or that it is solved by the usual foundationalist 
argument that such beliefs are justified simply by one's being 
conscious of the sensum. Why should a process of inquiring, 
understanding, hypothesizing, weighing the evidence be essential 
for some kinds of empirical knowledge but play no part at all in 
other kinds. If merely gaping at the planets does not suffice teach 
us the law of inverse squares, why should the same perceptual act, 
taken all by itself, constitute knowing that we are having such 
experiences, however banal that knowledge may be? But if acts of 
understanding and judgment are required, then, as BonJour rightly 
insists, so is justification; and if mere perception was not sufficient 
for justification in the first instance, neither will it be sufficient to 
justify the result of these further intellectual operations. What 
follows is a account of how empirical knowledge is attained. 
^ The theory of cognition presented here is, with two modifications, that of 
B.J.F. Lonergan. One modification is that, where Lonergan writes as though jus-
tification consisted of a second level insight that there are no further relevant 
questions remaining to be addressed by the first level insight [Lonergan, pp. 
308-312|, I argue that the constitutively conscious satisfaction of the first level 
curiosity by the first level insight constitutes justification. I prefer this view be-
cause I do not see how a justifying insight ("judgment") could itself escape the 
need for justification, or what would justify it if not the first level satisfaction 
together with an additional second level satisfaction of the second level query. 
Such a second level yes/no insight is attractive because it would provide a crisp, 
explicit closure, but 1 cannot convince myself that it is necessary or sufficient. 
The intended result is the same on either view, since the epistemic possibility of 
error, doubt, or revision depends upon there being further unresolved questions 
or issues. 
The other modification is my theory of error, which is not given explicitly 
by Lonergan but with which 1 think he would agree. For a lucid and relatively 
brief introduction to Lonergan, see Hugo Meynell's An Introduction to the Phi-
losophy of Bernard Lonergan, 2nd Ed; University of Toronto Press, 1991. 
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IL 1. Getting Cognitive Possession of the Data as Experiencing, 
Inquiring and Catching on 
If seeing a red patch were knowing there is a red patch, the 
question of justification would not arise, and knowing in this case 
would require no intelligence—not just very little intelligence, but 
none at all. In the same way, if knowing that a set of statements 
was coherent were merely to have understood each statement, then 
no further act of intelligence would be needed to grasp their coher-
ence or incoherence and the question of justification would not 
arise. And, to repeat, if acts of intelligence are required, then they 
must be justified. But we have seen that they cannot be justified by 
further judgments of coherence or by introducing "practices" which 
are not themselves justified. So if our problem has a solution it 
must at some point be possible to acquire justified true beliefs by 
operations performed on the data itself, where "data" means any-
thing in consciousness which is not yet known or fully known. 
Here I focus on the operation of intelligence; in the next section I 
face squarely the problem of how the content of such an act of 
intelligence is justified as a correct understanding of the data. 
Recall that the presence in consciousness of a red patch could 
not, given the rest of BonJour's account, play any role in justifying 
the belief (or hypothesis) that one was perceiving it (1.6). But con-
sider how BonJour must have arrived at his epistemological con-
victions. Would his theory be plausible even to himself if it had 
been formulated without his having had any prior experience what-
ever of knowing or trying to know? Does one merely hypothesize 
that empirical knowing is such and such and go on to evaluate the 
hypothesis, without reference, in either operation, to any experi-
ence of knowing or trying to know this or that? If one did succeed 
in justifying an epistemological hypothesis without such input, the 
resulting knowledge would be true of the experiences of knowing 
or trying to know without in any way being derived from those 
experiences. But acts of first level knowing or trying to know play 
the same role in working out epistemological theories as do sensa 
in first level cognitions. Of course, indirect justification could oc-
cur in a particular case by inference from other empirical knowl-
edge. But if data were always irrelevant to justification and if 
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BonJour's version of coherence theory doesn't work, how—ex-
cept by recourse to an viciously regressive coherence theory cut 
off from all extratheoretical input—would any knowledge be pos-
sible, either knowledge of our sense experiences or knowledge of 
how we acquire such knowledge? 
There is a question of experienced cognition fact here. Has the 
reader ever gotten curious about some data, puzzled over it, and 
caught on to something which struck her as intrinsic to the data? 
Was the curiosity about, directed to, the data? Were the formula-
tion of the puzzle and the insight into its solution directly related to 
her curiosity and the object of that curiosity? Was the correctness 
of the insight always verified independently of that data? 
Consider a sensum which, although you do not at first realize 
it, is in fact a geometrical construction drawn to prove a certain 
theorem. When it dawns on you that a theorem is being proved, 
what theorem it is, and why the proof works, it will, I suggest, 
strike you as patently at odds with the conscious epistemic acts 
you have just been performing to insist either that the increment in 
knowledge drew in no way at all on the experience or that the 
knowledge was nothing more than the experience. Would you or 
would you not able to show why the insight was correct (or at least 
cause someone else to have it) in terms of the data itself? 
Consider the analogous example of showing, in terms of the 
propositions themselves, that a set of proposition is coherent. Can 
such a judgment only be made by checking its coherence with hy-
potheses or beliefs other than those in whose logical relations we 
are interested? If so, cannot the same question be asked about the 
second judgment of coherence? A foundationalism of some sort is 
needed. Or consider BonJour's a priori theorem that extratheoretical 
causation is the best explanation of coherence. If this is theorem, 
its truth is not know deductively; it is known by a prior insight 
into, among other things, the relation between any set of non-ran-
dom beliefs and any non-random world. Deduction itself ultimately 
turns on a direct insight into the logical relation between premises 
and conclusion. If we accept such acts of direct insight into con-
ceptual data, on what grounds do we deny the equally common-
place occurrences of direct insight into data of sense? 
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It will be pointed out that, unlike the earlier reference to the 
law of inverse squares, the geometrical example given above in-
volved knowledge which was, in some sense, a priori, and that the 
second example involved conceptual or propositional data, that is, 
the contents of an act of understanding; whereas our puzzle about 
seeing a red patch involved neither. (Of course it is easy to produce 
cognitions which are quite simple and which are unquestionably 
empirical. Consider a pattern of colors: e.g., red; green; red red; 
green green; red red red; green green ? .) But is one really 
prepared to say that one acquired such a priori geometrical knowl-
edge quite independently of data which instantiates its truth, or 
that one could see that and how it was true of particular items of 
data without having some insight into the nature of the data it-
self?3 
In the case of conceptual data, as has already been noted, what 
is relevant to our problem is the potential such hypotheses have for 
further insights into their logical relations; in this respect they are 
like the example from geometrical and physics. And, again, if we 
can achieve a justified true hypothesis in these instances, why not 
in the case of knowing there is a red patch, however banal the 
insight may be? The alternative is to hold that in such simple cases 
knowing is just taking a look; but if so, it is difficult to see why 
anything more would be required in the more complex cases, as it 
obviously is. 
J Knowing there is a red patch does seem somehow different from knowing 
something about the patch, especially a necessary geometrical truth about it. Un-
like the so-called secondary qualities, primary qualities seem somehow 
uncapturable by insight. One just senses them, imagines them, conceives them as 
the referents of mass terms having scattered but concrete location (as "pieces of 
red"), or one links them with same as or same color as. The red qualia itself 
seems to elude conceptualization. It is as though the concept red patch must con-
sist at least partly of a red sensum if it is to have any content at all, whereas the 
concept four or perhaps even four sided need not be constituted by an image and 
would never (except by British empiricists) be literally identified with an image. 
Space does not permit an adequate discussion of this difficulty, but surely it would 
be a serious problem for any theory of empirical knowledge if such data proved 
to be intrinsically unintelligible. 
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There is no appeal here to "self-verifying" beliefs or hypoth-
eses. If one is preternaturally dull-witted, nothing prevents one's 
understanding the hypothesis There is a red patch at the same time 
one is seeing a red patch, but failing to grasp that the latter makes 
the former true. It is true that one could not have learned the mean-
ing of 'red patch' without observing red patches under appropriate 
circumstances; nevertheless, "red patch' means any red patch, not 
just those one happened to observe when learning the expression, 
among which the present red patch may not have appeared. To 
relate the proposition which is understood to the data which is sensed 
(or to propositions understood in a fragmented way) requires grasp-
ing the intelligibility of the data in the data. This is not the sort of 
foundationalism to which BonJour objects; it is a sort of 
foundationalism which he apparently has not considered. 
To summarize, BonJour is right in insisting that justification 
of an empirical "belief (hypothesis) cannot simply be a matter of 
looking at the data to "see" if the "belief (hypothesis) is true. Be-
lieving and hypothesizing are act of intelligence (both, for example, 
require at least one general term), but seeing is an act of sense. Part 
of the problem is to promote the latter to the status of the former. 
This last operation is crucial; for without it there is no possibility 
of relating the hypothesis to the data intelligibly, and with it no 
hypothesis is needed in the most fundamental case, as we shall see 
below. We need only be concerned in what follows with this most 
fundamental case. 
11.2.: Taking Cognitive Possession as Justifying an 
Insight into the Data 
Granted we can catch on to something intrinsic to the data it-
self, and that this is essential, in one way or another, to all empiri-
cal knowledge, how are such insights to be justified? Now, justifi-
cation of an insight cannot lie in experiencing the data or having 
the insight, for one has already done that and doing it again would 
not be helpful. Neither, obviously, can it be achieved by recourse 
to other insights into other data (of whatever sort), for these in turn 
raise the same issue; nor can it be a matter of knowing we are 
experiencing the data or having the insight for, besides being un-
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necessary, such knowledge would also require justification. This 
is where the issue was left in the Theaetetus. 
But why is it that we are interested in confronting the data, 
inventing hypotheses, having insights, and worrying about whether 
they are justified? One may have ulterior motives, of course, (say, 
to publish even though one will perish), but the motive that drives 
and guides the cognitional process intrinsically is just the desire to 
know, Aristotle's "wonder." It is because we want to "scratch" this 
"itch," to borrow a homely expression from Wittgenstein, that we 
are not content merely to experience the data but go on to hypoth-
esize about its intelligibility and seek to determine whether the 
hypothesis is true. We proceed in this way because we want what 
we are after with a desire which is intrinsically intelligent and nor-
mative, although in itself this motive does not constitute knowing 
anything. 
If the reader rejects this view, let him ask himself whether he 
rejects it because he has never had the experience of knowing or 
trying to know something; or because, although he has had such 
experiences, he remained utterly without curiosity about what con-
stituted such efforts as instances of knowing or trying to know; or 
because, having become intellectually engaged, he sought no in-
sights and proposed no hypotheses; or because, having gotten to 
that point, he had no interest at all in whether the insight or hypoth-
esis was correct? If the answer to any of these questions is 'Yes', 
his position surely loses all plausibility even in his own eyes. If, on 
the contrary, his view seems plausible to him because it met these 
criteria, let him ask himself whether the operative sense of "be-
cause" indicates something which at each stage was conscious and 
normative—not conscious merely as an object of consciousness or 
normative in the sense of a nomograph which intelligence con-
sults, but intrinsically conscious in the sense described above (1.6) 
and intrinsically normative in sense not unlike that in which thirst 
is said to be normative of what counts as drink. 
The problem is not whether there is such a normative intellec-
tual dynamic—the reader may easily determine that for herself, 
for to raise the question is ipso facto to answer it in the affirmative. 
The problem is to appropriate its significance for justification and, 
of course, to meet its demands on important issues. The desire to 
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know what is really the case, and the operations it generates for its 
satisfaction, are not "practices" in the sense of a convention, nor 
are they a motive and way of doing things by which we just hap-
pen to be ineluctably bound. They are the substance and sense of 
the cognitional enterprise, and would be the substance and sense 
of any attempt to show that they are not. They are "where the spade 
turns," to quote Wittgenstien again. 
If this is correct, then justification can be nothing other than 
the constitutively conscious satisfaction of this desire. We have 
been looking for justification in the wrong place. We have been 
looking at what needs to be justified and ignoring the normativity 
of the need itself. The intellectual satisfaction is the justification, 
for a rationally normative inquiry cannot but be consciously termi-
nated as successful when the demands intrinsic to that inquiry have 
been fully satisfied, that is, when nothing further remains to in-
quire about. For rejection or revision could only be a response to 
such unresolved questions. 
In the (distressingly rare and usually rather trivial) cases when 
this occurs one says that there remain no unresolved questions rel-
evant to the precise issue at hand. Is one not prepared to say this? 
Then quite evidently one's cognitive project is not yet consum-
mated, and if one is intellectually authentic one will go on inquir-
ing and trying to understand. "My answer is correct because it ter-
minates my questioning—that is what correct answers do." But is 
it really the answer or does it only seem so to me? Well, am I intel-
lectually satisfied or am I not? If not, I should reserve judgment 
while I examine the matter further. If I am, my skeptical question 
is a futile attempt at self-deception. But perhaps my inquiry is im-
mature, not sufficiently thorough and rigorous. To consider this 
possibility is to confirm the norm and to present one's self with the 
remedy. 
II.3. Objections: Subjectivity, Vacuity, Futility 
It will be vehemently objected that this account of justification 
is both subjective and vacuous. With regard to the first objection it 
may be pointed out that the norm—the intellectual need—to which 
the theory alludes is the very one which is motivating the objec-
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tion. Is the objector's objection subjective because it is the result 
of his authentic desire to get at the truth, to reject all fudging? Does 
he himself ever act on that motive? If he succeeds, will he know no 
more about what is really the case than if he had failed? If he thinks 
he has not succeeded, will that not be because he realizes there are 
further, relevant questions which need satisfactory answers? 
To be in the grip of this motive is definitive of objectivity on 
the part of the epistemic subject, just as, correlatively, what is the 
case is definitive of objectivity with regard to truth. Again, this 
will become evident when the claim is attacked; for the attack will 
attempt to show at just what stage in the process described above 
my argument went astray, and will implicitly appeal to my sense 
that any such offence runs counter to the intellectual desire I am, 
or ought to be, trying to satisfy. It will argue that there are relevant 
(not merely germane) issues which remain to be addressed or that 
the insights proposed as solutions are not satisfactory, and it will 
return to the problem to formulate those further questions and find 
more satisfactory insights. Thus every attempt to refute the pro-
posed theory will implicitly appeal to its truth, and the more vigor-
ously the refutation is argued, the more illuminatingly will it refute 
itself. In the same way, to demand that the theory itself be justified 
is to respond to the normative motive which that theory asserts to 
be controlling, and to be convinced that the theory cannot be justi-
fied is just to be conscious that it leaves that normative desire un-
satisfied. 
Is this account of empirical knowledge vacuous? Although the 
normativities invoked are constitutively conscious in the cogni-
tional operations, they can be explicitly formulated and thus made 
objects of consciousness. One is required to attend carefully, in-
quire intelligently, ask all the necessary questions, and accept only 
fully satisfactory insights as answers. One is urged to remain au-
thentically committed to this intellectual enterprise while he is en-
gaged in it and to be aware when he ceases to be engaged in it. 
The ways these motives and operations produce science are 
pretty well known. But even if one provided formulae that could 
be applied in every case by a clerk, the resulting knowledge would 
be only a clerk's knowledge. For if one wished to know anything it 
would still be necessary to care intellectually about whether the 
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algorithm was correct, to inquire whether it was, to catch on about 
why it works, and arrive at a fully satisfactory understanding. The 
appeal is to the normative motives and operations which are fun-
damental both to inventing such procedures and to applying them 
to specific cases. But if the norms and motives are not already 
operative in one's conscious life the attempt to formulate them 
explicitly will, of course, be futile; for one will understand neither 
the formulation nor what is being formulated. 
Those (many, I fear) who remain unconvinced will perhaps 
come to view this suggestion more sympathetically if they ask them-
selves once again what else justification could be. For it surely 
cannot be any hypothesis, insight, judgment, or percept, nor, in-
deed, the content or object of any epistemic act whatever; for these 
either require justification themselves or require an intellectual act 
which requires justification. And yet justification must be con-
sciously, essentially, and normatively related to all of them. 
It will also be objected that this account leaves us exactly where 
we were. How else would such an insight into the sensum be found 
to be satisfactory except by reference to the raw sensum? But it is 
not a question of referring to, that is, looking at, the raw data. We 
have already done that. Beyond experiencing, we are epistemically 
connected with the present sensum at the level of intelligence by 
our wonder, by our hankering to know. The insight into the data is 
both the response to and the satisfaction of that curiosity about the 
data. 
And note that, although it is perfectly possible to know that 
one's intellectual hankering is satisfied by the insight, it is not nec-
essary to have such knowledge. The act of insight into the data and 
the correlative normative satisfaction already comprise one, com-
plete, constitutively conscious act of knowing; and knowing that it 
does would constitute another such complete act of knowing. 
On this theory, justification turns out to provide both less and 
more than we had been expecting: less, because it does not de-
scribe types of arguments or evidence which would justify kinds 
of hypotheses provided we understood the arguments and evidence 
correctly; more, because it explains how it is that we can be more 
or less certain we have such correct understanding. The explana-
tion is neither mysterious nor recondite. Indeed, it probably strikes 
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the reader as an anticlimax. It describes a normative dynamic so 
familiar that one has perhaps never bothered to reflect upon it: a 
normativity which is at first consciously operative but implicit, 
grows more sophisticated and nuanced as we become intellectu-
ally mature and more familiar with the subject matter, but becomes 
explicit only with the kind philosophical reflection we have been 
engaged in. 
II.4. Getting It Right about Getting It Wrong 
Finally, the proposed theory does not provide a error-proof al-
gorithm; for to be error-proof would be to be literally foolproof, 
and we are all foolish from time to time. Of course that is a point in 
the theory's favor, for any epistemological theory must allow for, 
and indeed explain, the fact that we do make mistakes, that we are 
sometimes intellectually satisfied, it would seem, when we ought 
not to be. The present account does not solve Plato's puzzle about 
how we can be wrong, but it does clarify it. We err because the 
vigor of our intellectual curiosity, the pure, disinterested desire to 
know, fails, and when it fails our awareness that it is failing even-
tually fails with it. 
When one is a fully conscious intellectual player she cannot 
err (although she must very often withhold judgment); when one is 
completely without intellectual interests the question of being jus-
tified or not being justified does not arise, for then she is not a 
cognitive player at all. It is when one is not fully in one the state 
nor the other that she inquires inadequately and is no longer con-
scious that she does. The problem cannot be further pursued here 
(it troubles every plausible epistemology), but the present sugges-
tion, I submit, at least accurately describes what happens when 
one makes a mistake. 
II.5. Conclusion: Seeing Red with the Man-in-the-Street 
Recall the perplexity of our non-philosopher asked to justify 
his belief that he is experiencing a red sensum at the very instant 
he is in fact experiencing it. He was not at all perplexed about 
whether he was seeing what he was seeing; he was perplexed about 
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the philosopher's question. What more could the philosopher want, 
it being granted all around that there is a red patch before his con-
sciousness? It is now clear what the philosopher was, or should 
have been, after: he wanted to know whether the person he was 
addressing understood what 'seeing a red patch' means and was 
intellectually satisfied with his insight that the data before his con-
sciousness was an instance of one. 
It was because the inquiry was so banal and because a fully 
satisfactory insight posed no perceptible difficulty that the perplex-
ity arose. Of course our man-in-the street might have insisted that 
just seeing the red patch, or seeing the red patch while understand-
ing the expression "There is a red patch", was sufficient for know-
ing it. In that case he either would not have been justified in believ-
ing there was a red patch or would have misunderstood how he 
knew what he knew, in the same way the foundationalist with whom 
both BonJour and I disagree misunderstands how he knows what 
he knows. 
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